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HOLDERS OF JCS 1907/313

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A Report by the J-5

on

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)

~~CORRECTION~~

The action by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on Ehelösures Artot JCS 1907/313 is indicated in the 1st Note to Holders of JCS 1907/311.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

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1st N/H of JCS 1907/313

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. Question: How much of the Soviet nuclear strike force would be destroyed?

Answer:

a. JCS SIOP-62 plans for the attack of about 1,000 installations which bear a relationship to nuclear delivery capability. The Alert Force is scheduled to attack about 75 percent of these installations and, assuming timely tactical warning ^{or} on US pre-emption, so that all US alert forces survive through initial launch, may be expected to destroy* about 42 percent of the total, including all 76 airfields which constitute the home bases of the entire Soviet long-range nuclear strike capability and the known ICBM and IRBM sites. Programmed for attack by the Alert Force are all airfields with nuclear storage facilities, all primary staging bases, and all nuclear storage facilities. Not attacked by the Alert Force are 235 (out of a total of 750) airfields. These 235 airfields do not have military aircraft currently assigned and/or are inactive or do not have support facilities. The Full Force is scheduled to attack all of the approximately 1,000 installations and may expect to destroy about 88 percent of them, assuming no before-launch losses. Additional installations would be destroyed or damaged but at a level of assurance lesser than 70 percent. The level of assurance for destruction of all known installations representing a direct threat to the CONUS would be high - about 95 percent. Vulnerability of SIOP forces to destruction before launch is discussed in paragraph 3 f, below. In general, and assuming timely tactical warning of enemy missile attack, destruction before launch would be expected to be low for

* In each instance of the use of the term "destroyed," the term is applied to those targets with an assurance of 70 percent or greater of receiving severe damage, considering all factors of attrition and reliability except pre-launch destruction of SIOP forces.

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casualties and little immediate war supporting capability, the US would continue to exist as an organized and viable nation. The level of damage to the US would be comparable to that inflicted upon the USSR, as indicated above, but should permit the US to survive as a viable nation, and ultimately to prevail, whereas the USSR would not.

3. Question: What are the major uncertainties, e.g., regarding the size and disposition of the Soviet missile force, which underlie these judgments?

Answer: The major uncertainties lie in the areas of the size, location, posture and operational effectiveness of Soviet missile effort. Also important are the uncertainties concerning Soviet early warning capability, which relates to reaction times of all Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, and their operational capability to achieve simultaneity of attack on US forces, which affects greatly the destruction before launch of our own delivery vehicles. These areas of uncertainty are discussed below in greater detail.

a. No confirmed deployed locations of ICBMs have as yet been identified, other than the test ranges. There is evidence, with varying interpretations as to reliability, of some additional possible operational ICBM site-complexes. The most suspect locations for operational ICBM site-complexes are in northwestern USSR. All ICBM and IRBM operational sites are currently considered to be soft, but future hardening is considered probable. The primary element of uncertainty lies in the range of divergent views in current estimates of the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher. The full range of uncertainty as to the Soviet missile capability is reflected in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-61.*

b. It is assumed that the Soviets will strive to achieve simultaneity of arrival of ICBMs in the initial salvo against Western targets. Concerning the current reliability of the

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Soviet ICBM, it is estimated that some 40-65 percent of the total number of ICBMs on launcher would get off within 15-30 minutes of scheduled times and arrive in the vicinity of assigned targets (i.e., three times the nominal Circular Error Probable, (CEP) for the missile). If the Soviets launch first, initial missile and manned aircraft penetrations of the early warning and missile detection nets are expected to be well coordinated. However, full simultaneity of missile impact will not be achieved, but the Soviets will endeavor to coordinate closely, timewise, attacks on CONUS and Europe.

c. The Soviet active early warning capability is extensive, elaborate, and heavily overlapping, but limited to medium and high altitude cover about the periphery and sensitive interior areas. The only known gap is in the southcentral-southeastern section bordering on Tibet. This will doubtless be closed in the near future. The low altitude capability is limited. The development of high frequency ionospheric back-scatter radars for detection of long-range missile launchings has been within Soviet capabilities for the last five years. The Soviets also have a high capability for long-range passive detection.

d. The Soviet air defense system is undergoing a major transition which is significantly improving its capabilities against medium and high altitude air attack. The principal aspects of this transition are: the rapid installation of surface-to-air missile sites and the widespread deployment of an air defense control system with semi-automatic features. Other significant recent developments include the advent of better radars, the introduction of limited numbers of improved interceptors, the estimated introduction of nuclear weapons into surface-to-air missiles, and the probable incorporation of more advanced electronic gear and armament

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DAMAGE TO SINO-SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
DELIVERY CAPABILITY BY THE ALERT FORCE AND FULL FORCE

The number of installations on the target list of the Single Integrated Operational Plan 1962 (SIOP-62) is indicated below. Included is indication of the number of installations planned to be attacked and expected to be destroyed by either the Alert Force or the Full Force. The number indicated destroyed represents those installations which would be destroyed at a level of assurance of 70 percent or more, considering all factors of attrition and reliability of weapons except ^{destruction} ~~on-base~~ _{before loss.} ~~survivability.~~ The actual number destroyed or significantly damaged would be greater, but at a lesser level of confidence than 70 percent.

	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Attacked</u> <u>by</u> <u>Alert</u>	<u>Destroyed</u> <u>by</u> <u>Alert</u>	<u>Full</u>
<u>Nuclear Threat to United States</u>				
Airfields w/nuclear storage and primary staging bases	76	76	76	76
Nuclear storage	68	68	56	68
Missile sites and storage, ICBM	4	4	4	4
	<u>148</u>	<u>148</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>148</u>
<u>Nuclear Threat to Forward Area</u>				
Airfields w/o nuclear storage (nuclears could be deployed)	218	166	99	212
Missile sites, MRBM	6	6	1	6
Missile storage, MREM	1	1	1	1
Naval Base	29	26	20	28
	<u>254</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>247</u>
<u>Satellite Air Threat</u>				
Airfields w/o nuclear storage	88	56	24	83
Air-Surface Missile storage	5	5	5	5
	<u>93</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>88</u>

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4. While a number of studies have been conducted through recent years which indicate estimates of damage to the US civil society as a result of a nuclear exchange, there is no specific study conducted recently and generally accepted which can be drawn upon. A useful source would be the last annual NESC study conducted in 1959. Unfortunately, the results of that study are not available. However, a synthesis of past studies would indicate that while the US would be badly damaged, it would continue to exist as an organized viable nation.

5. Change 2 to SIOP-62, to be effective 15 July 1961, will reflect changes in position and levels of forces committed/ coordinated in the plan and results in major increases in alert force delivery vehicles and weapons. Effect of Change 2 generally is to increase the damage expected to be inflicted by the Alert Force as well as to decrease the probability of destruction before launch. Alert force assurance under Change 2 is 80% on 684 Desired Ground Zeros (DGZ) compared with 78% on 480 DGZs in the SIOP as originally developed. These assurances are averages, and do not fully take into account destruction before launch.

6. The major uncertainties, which underlie estimates of the ability of US and allied forces to accomplish the desired level of damage in general nuclear war, are in the area of Soviet capabilities and intentions, particularly as concern missiles. There is evidence, with varying interpretations as to reliability, of some additional possible operational ICBM site-complexes. The most suspect locations for operational ICBM site-complexes are in northwestern USSR. All ICBM and IREM operational sites are currently considered to be soft, but future hardening is considered probable. The primary element of uncertainty lies in the range of divergent views in current estimates of the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher. The full range of uncertainty as to the Soviet missile capability is reflected in current NIE 11-8-61. Capability to achieve simultaneity of missile detonation on target and aircraft penetration of early warning lines is probably a prime objective of the Soviet. Attainment of this capability, and US knowledge thereof, would have major impact upon our estimates.

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